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COMMENT
ITOBA LTD. V. LEP GROUP PLC:* AN
APPLE THAT FELL FROM THE WRONG
BRANCH
I. INTRODUCTION
"As the business world becomes increasingly global, capital
markets have become [increasingly] international in scope. "'
This "internationalization," combined with Congress'
unwillingness to occupy the field,2 has required U.S. courts to
develop workable tests to determine the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction over foreign securities transactions.3 To
this end, U.S. courts applied two separate and distinct tests4
for approximately twenty-five years before May 15, 1995. 5
* 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 703 (1996).
1. Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign
Tender Offers, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 523, 523 (1993).
2. William R. Covey, Comment, Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco,
S.A.: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities Laws in International
Equities Markets, 14 FoRDHAM INTL L.J. 240, 244 (1991) (noting the lack of
congressional guidance on the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws).
3. See id. As referred to in this Comment, the term "foreign securities
transactions" encompasses securities transactions that are predominantly conducted
outside of the United States.
4. The two tests are: (1) the effects test, which focuses on the effects felt
within the United States of a defendant's conduct which occurred abroad; and (2)
the conduct test, which focuses on a defendant's domestic conduct. See infra Part
II. See generally Covey, supra note 2. Covey notes: "U.S. courts apply both of
these tests and the satisfaction of the requirements of either test is sufficient for
the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 244-45; see also Gregory K.
Matson, Note, Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts over Transnational
Securities Fraud, 79 GEO. L.J. 141, 148-49 (1990) (the effects test and the conduct
test "have developed side by side, [with] each address[ing] fundamentally different
situations"); Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Insider Trading in American
Securities Regulation: Its Scope and Philosophy in a Global Marketplace, 16
HASTINGS NtL & COmp. L. REv. 175, 184 (1993) (noting that the conduct test is
the "alternative" to the effects test).
5. The decision in Itoba was announced on this date. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep
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Congressional acquiescence throughout this period to the two-
test framework implies Congress' satisfaction with the balance
of competing interests the two-test framework achieved.
On May 15, 1995, however, a panel of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals dismantled the two-test framework, and
toppled the delicate balance of competing interests it
maintained, by collapsing the framework into a single
admixture of the two tests.6 In Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC,'
the Second Circuit rejected the District Court of Connecticut's
decision to dismiss a claim concerning a British conglomerate's
purchase of British securities on the London Exchange due to a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.8 The Itoba court remanded
the case to the district court-despite the absence of a finding
of jurisdiction pursuant to either the conduct test or the effects
test applied separately-because the transaction satisfied an
admixture of the two tests.' This Comment argues that
dismantling the two-test framework, and thereby broadening
the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts and increasing
the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws, if
desirable, should result from the congressional fact-finding
mechanism. Moreover, judicial alteration of the application of
the tests for determining subject matter jurisdiction over
foreign securities transactions is inappropriate given the
polycentric nature of the issues at stake and the superior fact-
finding ability of the legislative branch of the U.S. government.
Thus, Itoba is the "apple," i.e., a legislative pronouncement,
that fell from the wrong "branch," i.e., the judicial branch.
Part II of this Comment describes the development of the
Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 703 (1996).
6. Id. at 122. The framing and the application of the courts' inquiry into the
existence of subject matter jurisdiction are particularly significant because a
finding of subject matter jurisdiction confers upon the court "the power to deal
with the general abstract question." 50 C.J.S. Jurisdiction (1947). A narrowly
framed and applied inquiry yields courts less power over a given range of
disputes, while the opposite is true for a broadly framed and applied inquiry.
Therefore, the decisions of how to frame and how to apply the inquiry to
determine the existence of subject matter jurisdiction are particularly significant
because they necessarily embody complex policy considerations regarding the
jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts and the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.
See infra Part VI.
7. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 118.
8. Id. at 124.
9. Id.
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law governing U.S. courts' subject matter jurisdiction over
foreign securities transactions during the twenty-five year
period prior to Itoba. Part III details the transaction
underlying Itoba. Part III also describes and analyzes the
recommendation of the federal magistrate judge and the
opinions of the District Court of Connecticut and the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. Part IV describes how Itoba expands
the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts and increases the
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws. Part V
examines the likely positive and negative effects of Itoba's
expansive approach. Finally, Part VI concludes that since the
possible negative effects of expanding subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign securities transactions are at least as
compelling as the possible positive effects, such a decision to
expand the jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts farther into the
international forum represents lawmaking more appropriately
reserved for Congress.
II. THE LAW OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS BEFORE ITOBA
By 1972, the Second Circuit had developed two tests to
determine the existence of subject matter jurisdiction over
foreign securities transactions: the effects test and the conduct
test.'° These tests remedied the "dearth of conclusive
statutory provisions and legislative history on the
extraterritorial jurisdiction of [U.S. securities laws].""
The effects test examines the effect within the United
States of a defendant's conduct which occurred abroad. 2 As
first enunciated," the effects test permitted district courts to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction over foreign securities
transactions in cases involving securities traded on a U.S.
exchange.' 4 This formulation of the effects test, however,
10. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208-09 (2d Cir.) (establishing the
effects test), rev'd on other grounds en banc, 405 F.2d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Leasco Data
Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1333-39 (2d Cir. 1972)
(establishing the conduct test).
11. Covey, supra note 2, at 244.
12. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208; see also Matson, supra note 4, at 149-54
(discussing Schoenbaum and the effects test).
13. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 200.
14. Id. at 208.
1996] 469
BROOK. J. INTL L.
proved too broad. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals later
refined the effects test by requiring plaintiff-investors to
demonstrate tangible, individualized injury caused by the
defendant's conduct."5  The refined effects test therefore
required that district courts examine the effect of the
defendant's conduct on a U.S. investor.16
Two premises underlie the development of the effects test.
First, U.S. courts should "protect domestic investors who
[purchase] foreign securities on American exchanges." 7
Second, U.S. courts should "protect the domestic securities
market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in
American securities.""
In contrast, the conduct test focuses on a defendant's
domestic conduct. 9 Pursuant to the modern formulation of
the conduct test, subject matter jurisdiction is limited to cases
involving the perpetration of "substantially completed
fraudulent acts," 0 as opposed to mere preparatory acts, by
the defendant.2
Like the effects test, two premises underlie the
development of the conduct test. First, U.S. securities laws
should apply extraterritorially if fraudulent conduct in
connection with a securities transaction occurred within the
United States.' Second, Congress should not "allow the
15. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 988 (2d Cir.) (finding a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction for U.S. courts in suit brought by foreign
nationals under U.S. securities laws, where collapsed Canadian corporation
adversely affected a U.S. exchange by offering stock to foreign nationals through a
prospectus containing false and misleading statements), cert. denied sub noma.
Bersch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
16. Id. at 991.
17. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
18. Id.
19. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d
Cir. 1972).
20. The "substantially completed fraudulent acts" requirement can reasonably
be derived from the Second Circuit's refusal to extend subject matter jurisdiction
to "mere preparatory activities" in IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d
Cir. 1975).
21. The requirement that fraudulent acts be substantially completed removed
from jurisdictional reach cases involving "mere preparatory activities ... for]
failure to prevent fraudulent acts where the bulk of the activity was performed in
foreign countries." Id.
22. Leasco, 468 F.2d at 1339 ("[TMhe nation where the conduct has occurred
has jurisdiction to displace foreign law and to direct its courts to apply its own
[law].").
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United States to be used as a base for manufacturing
fraudulent security devices for export, even when [such
devices] are peddled only to foreigners."'
In sum, for approximately twenty-five years before Itoba
and pursuant to the then well-defined conduct and effects
tests, the U.S. securities laws applied:
to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident in the
United States whether or not acts... of material importance
occurred in this country; and... to losses from sales of
securities to Americans resident abroad if, but only if,
acts... of material importance in the United States have
significantly contributed thereto; but... [did] not apply to
losses from sales of securities to foreigners outside the United
States unless acts ... within the United States directly
caused such losses.'
Thus, the two-test framework precluded foreign nationals from
suing foreign issuers in U.S. courts under U.S. securities laws
when the allegedly fraudulent conduct occurred abroad. This
was true regardless of the effect felt within the United States
of an issuer's conduct.
III. ITOBA LTD. V. LEP GROUP PLC
In Itoba, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit permitted a foreign national to sue a foreign issuer in a
U.S. district court for allegedly fraudulent conduct occurring
abroad based on a novel application of the effects test and the
conduct test. 6 This Part first details the facts underlying the
transaction before the Itoba court. Second, this Part describes
and analyzes the magistrate's recommendation, which the
District Court of Connecticut accepted without comment, and
23. Vencap, 519 F.2d at 1017. The conduct test prevents the United States
from becoming "a base for manufacturing fraudulent securities devices for export"
despite the requirement that fraudulent acts be substantially completed, because
the test focuses on the fraudulent conduct occurring domestically. As such, the
conduct test permits the exercise of jurisdiction over fraudulent activity occurring
within the United States but affecting only foreign nations. Id.
24. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Bersch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
25. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 703 (1996).
26. Id. at 122.
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the Second Circuit's opinion in Itoba.
A. Factual Background
Between June and November 1990, plaintiff Itoba Limited
(Itoba) bought more than thirty-seven million ordinary
shares2 7 of defendant Lep Group PLC (Lep) for approximately
$114 million.' Itoba, a Channel Islands29 corporation, is
wholly owned by A.D.T. Limited (ADT), a transnational hold-
ing company based in Bermuda." ADT's holdings also include
A.D.T. Securities Systems, Inc. (ADT Securities), a Delaware-
based firm providing security and protection services." ADT's
shares trade on the New York Stock Exchange and approxi-
mately half of its shareholders live in the United States.32 Lep
is a British conglomerate whose ordinary shares trade on the
London Exchange. 3
In the late 1980s, ADT considered expanding ADT Securi-
ties by acquiring the latter's major competitor, National
Guardian, which is a Lep subsidiary. 4 ADT discovered that
an unrelated third party, Canadian Pacific, also desired to
acquire Lep."5 Negotiations between ADT and Canadian Pacif-
ic culminated in an agreement to explore the joint purchase of
Lep.3" Under this agreement, ADT directed Nicholas Wells
(Wells), ADT's in-house financial analyst, to value Lep. Mean-
while, Canadian Pacific hired S.G. Warburg (Warburg), a Brit-
ish investment bank, to evaluate Lep's business operations.37
27. Ordinary shares are the British equivalent of common stock in the United
States. Id. at 120; GLENN G. MUNN ET AL., THE ST. JAMES ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
BANKING & FINANCE 783 (9th ed. 1991).
28. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 121.
29. The Channel Islands are "a group of islands in the English Channel, off
the Northwest coast of France. They are a possession of the British Crown, but
they are not part of the United Kingdom." 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 278 (Intl
ed. 1984). For the purposes of this Comment, Itoba is referred to as a British
Company.
30. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 120.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. "London Exchange" is shorthand for the International Stock Exchange
of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland Ltd. Id.
34. Id. ADT contemplated acquiring National Guardian by buying Lep. Id.
35. Id. at 120-21. Canadian Pacific planned to buy Lep in order to enter the
freight forwarding business. Id. at 120.
36. Id. at 121.
37. Id.
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Warburg evaluated Lep's business operations based on its
(i) 1988 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form 20-
F,3 (ii) United Kingdom annual reports, (iii) shareholder reg-
ister, and (iv) analyst reports.39 Soon after Warburg complet-
ed its evaluation, Canadian Pacific lost interest in the joint
purchase.40 ADT, however, remained interested in acquiring
Lep, so Wells continued his valuation.4' He supplemented his
research with the Warburg report and with a copy of Lep's
1988 SEC Form 20-F, which he received from Canadian Pacif-
ic.
42
Based on Wells' analyses and the Warburg report, ADT's
chairman, Michael Ashcroft, concluded that ADT should ac-
quire Lep.' ADT then formulated a plan whereby Itoba would
buy Lep shares anonymously and in installments.' By No-
vember 1990, Itoba invested approximately $114 million in
Lep.
45
Soon thereafter, Lep's share price plummeted ninety-seven
percent, causing the value of Itoba's investment to decline $111
million to $3 million.4" Itoba attributes this decline to a series
of business reversals resulting in a $522 million write-off from
38. SEC Form 20-F is a mandatory filing pursuant to the registration require-
ments of 12(b) or 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. PETER E. YAEGER,
SECURITIES FILINGS: REVIEW & UPDATE 97 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Hand-
book Series No. 351, 1980). Private foreign issuers use SEC Form 20-F to register
classes of securities on U.S. exchanges. Id. at 96-97. SEC Form 20-F requires
extensive disclosure by foreign securities issuers in order to provide U.S. investors
with a level of information as equal as possible and practicable to that provided to
investors in domestic securities. Id. at 96. A completed Form 20-F must include a
description of the foreign issuer's business and a discussion and analysis, prepared
by management, of the issuer's statements of income. Id. at 100-01. Pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act's registration requirements, Lep filed Form 20-F for
the year ended December 31, 1988, Itoba, 54 F.3d at 121, as it deposited nearly
13 million of its approximately 136 million outstanding shares in an American
depository in 1988, id. at 120. Lep deposited these shares to create a U.S. market
for its ordinary shares. Id. For a discussion of American Depository Receipts, see
infra Part V.B.
39. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 121.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Itoba likely bought the shares anonymously and in installments to
minimize the effect on the stock price of the planned acquisition.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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Lep's books in the year ended 1991.4' Itoba claims Lep violat-
ed Rule 10b-54' and sections 10(b) and 20 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934V9 by investing in speculative business
47. Id.
48. Rule 10b-5, promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, pro-
vides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
49. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange . .. [t]o use or employ,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manip-
ulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). Section 20 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that:
(a) . . . Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person lia-
ble under any provision of [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] or any
rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to
whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted
in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.
(b) . . . It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do
any act or thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under
the provisions of [the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 or any rule or
regulation thereunder through or by means of any other person.
(c) . . . It shall be unlawful for any director or officer of, or any owner
of any securities issued by, any issuer required to file any document,
report, or information under [the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 or any
rule or regulation thereunder without just cause to hinder, delay, or ob-
struct the making or filing of any such document, report, or information.
(d)... Wherever communicating, or purchasing or selling a security
while in possession of, material nonpublic information would violate, or
result in liability to any purchaser or seller of the security under any
provision of [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] or any rule or regula-
tion thereunder, such conduct in connection with a purchase or sale of a
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege with respect to such security or
19961 ITOBA LTD. v. LEP GROUP PLC 475
ventures without informing the public.50
B. The Magistrate Judge's Recommendation and Its Accep-
tance by the U.S. District Court of Connecticut
Magistrate Judge Jean Margolis applied the conduct test
and the effects test separately to the transaction underlying
Itoba's claim and concluded that the district court should dis-
miss the claim due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.5'
The magistrate found that effects jurisdiction did not exist
because the alleged fraud committed abroad did not affect
stock traded on a U.S. securities exchange and bought by a
U.S. investor.52 The magistrate reasoned that the fraud alleg-
edly committed abroad53 did not detrimentally affect a U.S.
investor since the plaintiff (Itoba) is a British company.' 4 The
magistrate further reasoned that if ADT, rather than Itoba,
were the plaintiff, the U.S. district court would have jurisdic-
tion pursuant to the effects test, since ADT's stock trades on a
U.S. securities exchange and about half of its shareholders live
in the United States.55
Additionally, the magistrate rejected the presence of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction by the district court on the basis of the
conduct test.6 Two reasons underlie this rejection. First,
with respect to a group or index of securities including such security,
shall also violate and result in comparable liability to any purchaser or
seller of that security under such provision, rule, or regulation.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)-(d) (1994).
50. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 121. The essence of Itoba's claim is that Lep's failure to
disclose risky investments artificially inflated Lep's share price before Itoba bought
the Lep shares. See id& Since the market impounds publicly available information
into share price, Itoba contends that Lep's failure to disclose such information
artificially inflated Lep's share price because the share price failed to fairly reflect
the risk associated with these investments. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN
ECONOMICS 123 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter MIT DICTIONARY]
(defining the Efficient Market Hypothesis).
51. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 121-23. Procedurally, magistrate judges may be appoint-
ed to issue recommendations and other reports to federal district judges. For an
overview of the powers vested in magistrate judges, see 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1994).
52. Id. at 124. The Lep ordinary shares purchased by Itoba were traded on
the London Exchange. Id. at 121, 123.
53. In order to determine whether the district court possessed subject matter
jurisdiction, it appears that the magistrate assumed without deciding that Lep's
failure to disclose the speculative business ventures amounted to fraud.
54. See Itoba, 54 F.3d at 124.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 122.
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Itoba and ADT did not read and rely on Lep's SEC Form 20-F;
rather, it was an investment bank (Warburg) hired by ADT
that reviewed that filing.57 Second, Lep filed SEC Form 20-
F"8 to register its American Depository Receipts (ADRs)69
and not in connection with the ordinary Lep shares Itoba
bought.0 Therefore, Lep's conduct within the United States
(filing allegedly fraudulent information with the SEC) did not
relate to Itoba's purchase, and, because of this, Itoba failed to
prove that Lep's U.S. conduct directly caused Itoba's losses.
Thus, since the transaction in Itoba failed to satisfy either
the conduct or the effects tests, the magistrate judge recom-
mended that the district court dismiss Itoba's claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.6' The U.S. District Court for the
District of Connecticut adopted the magistrate's recommenda-
tion62 and dismissed Itoba's claim in a short-form order.63
C. The Decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
A panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opin-
ion written by Judge Ellsworth A. Van Graafeiland, reversed
the district court's decision to dismiss Itoba's claims due to a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case for
trial by the district court.' The Itoba court reached this con-
clusion by dismantling the two-test framework and replacing it
with a single "admixture," or combination of the two tests.65
In rejecting the traditional compartmentalized use of the two-
test framework, the court propounded that "[t]here is no re-
quirement that these two tests be applied separately and dis-
tinctly from each other."6 Furthermore, the court remarked
that the "admixture... often gives a better picture of whether
there is sufficient United States involvement to justify the
57. Id.
58. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the mechan-
ics of the ADR market, see infra Part V.B.1.
60. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122.
61. Id. at 121.
62. See supra note 53.
63. The district court dismissed the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 121.
64. Id. at 118, 125.
65. Id. at 122.
66. Id.
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exercise of jurisdiction by an American court." 7
The Second Circuit outlined and then refuted the
magistrate's reasoning and her conclusions.68 It rejected the
magistrate's effects test analysis because ADT, a U.S. corpora-
tion, owned 100% of Itoba.69 On this point, the Second Circuit
reasoned that ADT ultimately financed Itoba's purchase of the
Lep stock and, consequently, ADT's shareholders (about half of
whom live in the United States) ultimately bore the loss.70
Therefore, the court concluded that Lep's foreign conduct af-
fected shares (ADT's shares) traded on a U.S. exchange and
U.S. investors (ADT's shareholders).7 However, while the
court rejected the magistrate's analysis of the effects test, it
avoided declaring the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in
the district court pursuant to the effects test alone.72
The Itoba court also rejected the two reasons which led the
magistrate to conclude that Itoba's claim failed to satisfy the
conduct test."3 The Second Circuit rejected the magistrate's
first reason----"that ADT and Itoba did not read and rely on
[Lep's] SEC filing in making their purchase decision"-on two
grounds.74 First, the Second Circuit noted that Itoba-or, as
the Second Circuit construed it, ADT-based its investment
decision on the Warburg report and Wells' evaluation of Lep's
SEC Form 20-F." Second, the court did not require that
Itoba's directors personally read the SEC filings so long as
they based their decision to acquire Lep on Wells' analysis.76
67. Id.
68. Id. at 122-24.
69. Id. at 124.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id.
73. Id. at 123.
74. Id. at 122.
75. Id.
76. "The fact that Itoba's board members did not read the SEC filing is not of
controlling significance. A party need not personally have read a misleading finan-
cial report to establish reliance; derivative reliance is a well-established basis for
liability in a Rule 10b-5 action." Id. (citing Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168,
177-78 & n.19 (8th Cir. 1982), appeal after remand, 768 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1985),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647 (1986);
Garfinkel v. Memory Metals, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 1397, 1404 (D. Conn. 1988);
Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 104 F.R.D. 50, 53-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1984);
Walsh v. Butcher & Sherrerd, 452 F. Supp. 80, 84 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re Ramada
Inns Sec. Litig., 550 F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (D. Del. 1982)).
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The court also rejected the magistrate's second reason for
denying jurisdiction under the conduct test: that Lep filed SEC
Form 20-F to register ADRs and not in connection with its
ordinary shares.7 The court based this rejection on several
grounds. First, it relied upon the direct correlation between the
price of the ADRs and the price of the ordinary shares, since
five ordinary shares comprise each ADR."8 Second, the court
relied on In re Ames Department Stores Inc. Stock Litigation79
to bypass the fact that Itoba bought Lep's ordinary shares and
not its ADRs (the security to which the SEC Form 20-F re-
lates)." Finally, the Itoba court rejected the magistrate's sec-
ond reason by denying the significance of the fact that Itoba
bought ordinary shares of a British entity, which were issued
in England and traded on the London Exchange.8' The Itoba
court reasoned that which security was purchased was imma-
terial since the conduct test is concerned only with fraudulent
conduct within the United States.82 Just as it did with the
effects test, the Itoba court refuted the magistrate's reasoning
for denying jurisdiction under the conduct test, but declined to
conclude that the transaction satisfied the conduct test."
In the end, the Itoba court never declared the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction under either the conduct test or the
effects test. Rather, the court held that "a sufficient combina-
tion of ingredients of the conduct and effects test is present in
the instant case to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the
district court.""
77. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 123.
78. Id. ("If the ordinary share price fell on the London Exchange, the market
price of an ADR would decrease in similar manner, and vice versa.").
79. 991 F.2d 953, 961-62 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that a false and misleading
statement in an SEC filing pertaining to a security other than the purchased
security does not preclude a Rule 10b-5 action).
80. See Itoba, 54 F.3d at 123.
81. Id. at 122-23.
82. Id. at 123 (citing Psinenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d
Cir. 1983); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1337
(2d Cir. 1972)).
83. See id. at 124.
84. Id. The Second Circuit buttressed its conclusion that subject matter ju-
risdiction was present under the admixture with another "ingredient" previously
relevant only under a conduct test analysis, namely, that the making of the alleg-
edly false and misleading filings with the SEC was not "merely preparatory to the
fraud." Id. at 123. It did so by noting that "[iun view of the deleterious effect this
continued nondisclosure had on thousands of ADT shareholders in the United
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IV. How ITOBA EXPANDS THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
OF U.S. COURTS AND INCREASES THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLI-
CATION OF U.S. SECURITIES LAWS
Itoba expands the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts
over foreign securities transactions and increases the extrater-
ritorial application of U.S. securities laws by abandoning the
compartmentalized two-test framework.' Removing the re-
quirement86 that a claim satisfy either the conduct test or the
effects test in full and in isolation leaves a single examination
of all facts applicable to both tests." The inherent nature of
this single examination allows a claim to fail the conduct test
and the effects test when applied separately, but still pass
jurisdictional muster, since facts applicable to one test can now
be aggregated with facts applicable to the other test to support
a finding of subject matter jurisdiction. Claims that would
have failed both the conduct test and the effects test, and
would therefore have been excluded from judicial review, now
have a third chance for U.S. review under Itoba's admixture.
Moreover, this new class of cases resulting from Itoba's expan-
sive approach to subject matter jurisdiction broadens the extra-
territorial application of U.S. securities laws by applying such
laws to a wider range of disputes.
The two-test framework, by its nature, compartmentalized
a district court's inquiry into the presence of subject matter
jurisdiction. Since district courts applied each test in isolation
and required the complete satisfaction of at least one test to
yield a finding of subject matter jurisdiction, courts ignored
facts relevant to an analysis of one test while applying the
other test. This compartmentalization feature of the two-test
framework limited the scope of transactions falling within the
purview of U.S. courts because transactions that nearly passed
muster under each test, but nevertheless fell short under both
States, it cannot be described correctly as incidental or preparatory." Id. at 124.
85. See supra Part II.
86. While Itoba denies the existence of a requirement that the two tests be
applied in isolation, Itoba, 54 F.3d at 121-22, courts consistently applied them this
way. For an example of the separate application of the two tests by the courts,
see the recommendation of the magistrate judge described in Itoba, supra Part
III.B. Academic literature also echoes the presence of two separate and distinct
tests. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
87. This single examination of all facts applicable to both tests is what the
Itoba court referred to as the admixture. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122.
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tests, were excluded.
In contrast with the two-test framework, Itoba's admixture
requires a single examination of all facts applicable to both
tests. This "melting pot" approach allows for instances where
the separate application of the two tests would not have yield-
ed subject matter jurisdiction, but a single examination of an
aggregation of facts pertinent to both tests will yield such a
finding since courts never ignore facts through
compartmentalization." Moreover, by broadening the subject
matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts, Itoba broadens the extrater-
ritorial application of U.S. securities laws.
V. LIKELY POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF ITOBA's ADMIX-
TURE
Itoba's expansion of subject matter jurisdiction of U.S.
courts and the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities
laws necessarily affects many interests in many ways. This
Part examines a likely benefit, increased worldwide investor
protection, and two likely detriments, constriction of the
ADRW9 market and damage to international comity, of Itoba's
expansive approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign
securities transactions.
A. Likely Positive Effect of Itoba's Admixture
The most likely positive effect of Itoba's expansive ap-
proach to U.S. courts' subject matter jurisdiction over foreign
securities transactions will be increased investor protection
worldwide. Itoba's admixture opens U.S. courts to more extra-
territorial complaints than did the two-test framework."
Combining increased access to U.S. courts with the most com-
prehensive securities regulation in the world,9 i.e., the U.S.
88. While it may be true that the admixture "often gives a better picture" of
a transaction, Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122, the fact remains that the admixture expands
the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts.
89. See infra note 102 and accompanying text; see also supra note 38 (rela-
tionship between SEC Form 20-F and ADRs).
90. See infra Part VI.
91. Lauren D. Rosenthal, Note, Rule 10b-5 and Transnational Bankruptcies:
Whose Law Should Apply?, 61 FORDHAMi L. REV. S321, S339 (1993) ("United States
securities laws are ... more inclusive and comprehensive in scope than compara-
ble laws of other countries"); see also Andrew N. Grass, Jr., Internationalization of
the Securities Trading Markets, 9 Hous. J. INT'L L. 17, 49 (1986) (noting that the
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securities laws, has the potential to greatly increase investor
protection worldwide. 2
This increased worldwide investor protection will likely
result primarily from two sources. First, comprehensive U.S.
securities laws afford injured investors unique protections and
greater chances of recovery than do the securities laws of other
nations. More specifically, the emphasis on accountability inte-
gral to the U.S. securities regulatory framework 3 permits
injured investors greater opportunities for redress by allowing
them to hold key players responsible in situations where re-
dress would be unavailable under foreign regulatory schemes.
Second, the possibility of liability under rigid U.S. securi-
ties regulation will likely affect the behavior of foreign securi-
ties issuers. A foreign issuer, aware that his actions may result
in the need to defend against charges of violating U.S. securi-
ties laws in a U.S. tribunal, will likely conduct his business
with increased caution. Therefore, Itoba's expansive approach,
through the increased application of comprehensive securities
laws and its affect on foreign securities issuers, will likely lead
to greater investor protection globally.
Expanding U.S. courts' jurisdiction to provide increased
investor protection globally is consistent with other circuits'
view that judicially expanding jurisdiction over foreign securi-
ties transactions represents a positive transition in securities
law.94 This view rests on three tenets, all of which are pre-
scope of insider trading regulation is far more developed in the United States than
in other nations); Elyse Diamond, Note, Outside Investors: A New Breed of Inside
Traders, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational
Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S319, S338-47 (1992) (com-
paring key aspects of U.S. securities regulations with their foreign counterparts
and concluding that the "United States securities law is by far the most compre-
hensive.").
92. See Rosenthal, supra note 91, at S339.
93. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 178-79. Langevoort explains that U.S. securi-
ties regulation reflects Congress view that investment information which fairly re-
flects market realities can prevent market crashes like that of 1929. Id. Therefore,
Congress drafted the U.S. securities laws to ensure that investment information
fairly reflects underlying market realities. Id. A key method used to ensure the
dissemination of such information is to hold information disseminators accountable
for investment information that fails to reflect fairly that which it purports to
reflect. Id.
94. See Continental Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d
409 (8th Cir. 1979) ("[Olur decision in favor of finding subject matter jurisdiction
is largely based upon policy considerations"). But see Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen
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mised on increased investor protection. First, failure to apply
U.S. securities laws to substantially all situations involving
domestic conduct permits the United States to "become a
'haven' for defrauders who could then export their schemes
abroad.""5 Second, the United States should "encourage effec-
tive anti-fraud enforcement internationally."" Third, broad
extraterritorial enforcement of the Securities Exchange Act's
anti-fraud provisions is consistent with Congress' intent "to
elevate the standard of conduct in [all] securities
transactions."97
Itoba is consistent with discouraging securities fraud do-
mestically, since it permits U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction
in cases narrowly failing to satisfy either the conduct test or
the effects test. Itoba's admixture allows U.S. courts to supple-
ment otherwise insufficient evidence of fraudulent conduct
which occurred in the United States with evidence of fraudu-
lent conduct which occurred abroad and which yielded a nega-
tive domestic effect.9" Itoba's admixture also allows U.S.
courts to supplement otherwise insufficient evidence of a nega-
tive domestic effect resulting from fraudulent conduct abroad
with evidence of fraudulent activities which occurred in the
United States.9 The admixture therefore suits the first tenet
of jurisdictional expansion by decreasing the likelihood that
fraudulent conduct which occurred in the United States will
escape the jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts.
Itoba also suits the second tenet listed above-encouraging
effective international anti-fraud enforcement-by demonstrat-
ing the United States' strong commitment to the effective in-
ternational enforcement of securities regulation. Itoba declares
to the world that at least some U.S. courts will now comple-
ment the comprehensive U.S. securities laws with expanded
& Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30-31 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Bork, J.) (rejecting expansive approach
to jurisdiction adopted by Continental Grain in favor of more restrictive two-test
framework).
95. Matson, supra note 4, at 164 (citing Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 421).
96. Continental Grain, 592 F.2d at 421 (citing with approval SEC v. Kasser,
548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Churchill Forest Indus. (Manito-
ba), Ltd. v. SEC, 431 U.S. 938 (1977)).
97. Id. For an effective rebuttal of the argument for expanding jurisdiction
over foreign securities transactions in the absence of clear congressional guidance,
see Matson,, supra note 6, at 163-66; see also Zoelsch, 824 F.2d at 29-33.
98. See infra Part IV.
99. See infra Part IV.
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judicial enforcement. If foreign securities regulators equate
these two factors-rigid regulation and extensive judicial en-
forcement-with the general confidence and integrity of the
U.S. securities markets (as compared with many foreign mar-
kets) foreign regulators will likely pursue more effective anti-
fraud legislation and escalate their own enforcement efforts. If
one takes the position that fraud is an evil in itself and that it
is in the interest of the international community to eradicate
all fraud,'0 then Itoba's expansive approach to international
securities regulation represents a positive development in
encouraging international anti-fraud enforcement.
Itoba also furthers the congressional goal of elevating the
standard of conduct in securities transactions, which is the
third tenet of jurisdictional expansion. Itoba applies the com-
prehensive U.S. securities laws to cases that previously would
likely have escaped U.S. regulation.'0 ' Therefore, Itoba ele-
vates the standard of conduct in securities transactions by
increasing the likelihood that U.S. courts will apply U.S. secu-
rities laws to foreign securities transactions.
Itoba's expansive approach will likely lead to more effec-
tive investor protection globally. This represents a potential
positive effect of the decision, especially given the explicit view
of other circuits that the United States should judicially ex-
pand its jurisdictional reach to protect investors in foreign
securities transactions despite the absence of congressional
guidance.
100. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 175-76 (explicating the view that "because
fraud is 'bad,' no nation should seriously object to the application of the American
anti-fraud provisions abroad where the result is simply to remedy such fraud"); see
also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Jurisdiction to Prescribe: Some Contributions From an
International Lawyer, 4 B.U. INT' L.J. 91, 95 (1986) (noting that no nation has
ever accused the United States of invading territorial sovereignty by
extraterritorializing securities fraud jurisdiction).
101. In addition to increasing investor protection, it should be noted that Itoba
addresses a fundamental nationalistic ideal, namely, the United States sovereign
interest in protecting its citizens and its capital markets. Since the United States
permits foreign issuers to access capital from its citizens, foreign issuers should
not be surprised when the United States regulates the capital formation process. If
this were not the case, the borders of the United States would permit capital
formation, but would prohibit the regulation of that capital formation. John M.
Fedders, Policing Trans-Border Fraud in the United States Securities Markets: The
"Waiver By Conduct" Concept-A Possible Alternative or a Starting Point For Dis-
cussions?, 11 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 477, 488 (1985) ("Borders stop judges, law en-
forcement officials, and private plaintiffs, but not criminals.").
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B. Likely Negative Effects of Itoba's Admixture
Expanding the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts
over foreign securities transactions, thereby broadening the
application of U.S. securities laws extraterritorially, will also
likely produce negative effects. Itoba's two most likely negative
effects are its chilling effect on the ADR0 2 market and its
erosive effect on international comity.
1. Likely Negative Effect on the ADR Market
Perhaps Itoba's most detrimental aspect is its potential
chilling effect on the ADR market. The ADR market mecha-
nism allows international securities transactions to settle more
efficiently than they would without it.' °3 This efficiency
translates into a lower cost of capital for foreign corporations
and ultimately higher returns for domestic investors. The me-
chanics of creating an ADR, and some of the virtues of ADRs,
are summarized in the following passage:
The distribution of ADRs for a foreign stock in the Unit-
ed States begins with the deposit of the stock in a bank,
typically in the jurisdiction of the issuer. The bank then is-
sues receipts. Thus, while the shares remain in a bank in
Europe or Japan, the receipts can be distributed into the
United States. A secondary market in the United States can
then develop.
This simple process "domesticates" the foreign security,
permitting investors in the United States to trade the ADR in
102. ADRs are "[ilorms for listing... shares of foreign companies on American
stock exchanges in an acceptable American bank or trust company, representing
the deposit of an equivalent amount of underlying foreign shares." MUNN, supra
note 27, at 33. Stated another way, an ADR is "a receipt for shares held in a
deposit in a foreign branch of an American bank, when those shares are in a
foreign corporation. ADR's are negotiable and are used by foreign corporations to
sell shares in the United States." MICHAEL C. THoMsETr, INVESTmiENT & SECU-
RiTIES DICTIONARY 10 (Webster's New World 1988) (1986). ADRs are a "low tech,"
mechanical method of creating a more global securities market. Richard P. Ber-
nard, International Linkages Between Securities Markets: "A Ring of Dinosaurs
Joining Hands and Dancing Together"?, 1987 CoLum. BUS. L. REV. 321, 327. ADRs
have existed for more than fifty years and are currently traded on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the National
Association of Securities Dealers and Quotes (NASDAQ). Id. at 327-28.
103. This is primarily because the ADR market mechanism allows U.S. inves-
tors to avoid trading directly on foreign markets. See infra note 108 and accom-
panying text.
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their own currency. Their trades are settled through the
clearing and settlement system of the United States, thus
avoiding, for example, the fortnightly settlement in the Unit-
ed Kingdom and the physical delivery system in Japan. The
investor may even be able to avoid in part stock transfer
taxes in the domicile of the issuer since, from the standpoint
of the register of the issuer, the stock remains registered in
the name of the depository bank. Therefore, it is not surpris-
ing that approximately 1.5 billion shares are today traded in
ADR form.'"
Itoba's expansion of U.S. courts' subject matter jurisdiction
over foreign securities transactions will likely cause foreign
securities issuers to reconsider offering ADRs because of the
increased possibility of having to defend against charges of
violating rigid U.S. securities laws in a U.S. court.115 The vir-
tues, described above, of the ADR market require careful scru-
tiny of domestic lawmaking that potentially hinders the work-
ings of that market.
Itoba presents a quandary for foreign securities issuers. It
forces them to weigh their interest in obtaining U.S. capital
with the increased likelihood that U.S. courts will force them
to defend, in the United States, against charges of violating
rigid U.S. securities laws.' 5 Given the relatively small per-
centage of foreign stock a foreign issuer generally reserves for
ADRs, the tremendous potential downside of defending against
charges of violating U.S. securities laws in a U.S. tribunal will
likely chill capital formation through the ADR market. Foreign
securities issuers will likely shun this previously effective
capital accumulation mechanism,0 7 forcing U.S. investors to
seek these potentially lucrative foreign issues through a less
104. Bernard, supra note 102, at 328.
105. See Mary K. Kane, Dispute Resolution in the United States: Concerns and
Opportunities in an Era of Globalization of Securities Markets, 14 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 405, 411 (1990) ("it is clear that the extraterritorial application
of U.S. antifraud provisions in a global securities market will cause serious con-
cern"); Langevoort, supra note 4, at 185-86 (noting that "to the extent that similar
jurisdictional claims could be made by other nations, there is strong potential for
multiple, overlapping standards of conduct being applied to the same transactions,
substantially burdening the processes of planning and dispute resolution with du-
plication and uncertainty").
106. For an overview of the comprehensive nature of U.S. securities law, see
sources cited supra note 91.
107. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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efficient and effective channel. 10 8
Itoba's facts illustrate why foreign securities issuers may
balk at the ADR market with the Itoba approach in place.
Itoba's transaction is "at its core, a transaction between for-
eigners, involving foreign securities purchased on a foreign
securities market."' 9 The ordinary shares Itoba bought rep-
resent ownership of a British entity."0 Itoba is itself a Brit-
ish entity."' And Itoba bought British ordinary shares and
did so on the London Exchange." These critical facts suggest
the genuine "foreignness" of the transaction underlying Itoba.
This "foreignness" counsels against the existence of subject
matter jurisdiction in a U.S. court, and yet, the Itoba court
found such jurisdiction."'
Thus, Itoba raises the possibility that a court sensing
securities fraud could use the admixture to manufacture sub-
ject matter jurisdiction in cases where the presence of such
jurisdiction is marginal at best. Through this possibility, Itoba
creates a potential for abuse, especially in cases where a small
foreign investor can garner sympathy for his claim against a
large foreign conglomerate. The admixture-by allowing a
simple marshaling of the facts to create the appearance of
well-founded, yet arguably non-existent, subject matter juris-
diction-permits courts to overstep their bounds and apply
U.S. securities laws to "very" foreign securities transactions.
An analysis of the Itoba decision illustrates this potential
for abuse. The Itoba court disregarded Itoba's purchase of ordi-
nary shares, as opposed to ADRs, by highlighting the correla-
tion between the value of the ordinary shares and the value of
the ADRs." The Itoba court also circumvented Itoba's identi-
108. The less efficient and effective channel requires the U.S. investor to pur-
chase the foreign shares directly on the foreign market on which they trade. By
doing so, however, U.S. investors lose the benefits of the ADR market. See supra
note 102 and accompanying text.
109. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 9, Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d
118 (2d Cir. 1995) (No. 94-7562), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 703 (1996).
110. See Itoba, 54 F.3d at 120.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 121.
113. Given the British interest in this dispute and the international comity
issues discussed infra Part V.B.2, a finding by the Itoba court that subject matter
jurisdiction was not present likely would have forced a more appropriate result.
That is, the Second Circuit should have forced Itoba to seek redress in a British
tribunal pursuant to British securities laws by dismissing the complaint.
114. Itoba, 54 F.3d at 123. The Itoba court relied on the direct relationship
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ty as a British company by emphasizing that a U.S. company
owns Itoba."' In essence, the Itoba court constructed argu-
ments to dismiss the "foreignness" of the transaction and
forced Lep to defend against charges in the United States
based on a mandatory SEC filing. The SEC filing, however,
was made only to register ADRs representing less than ten
percent of Lep's shares, and, Itoba did not even buy the securi-
ties this filing covered. Given the actual "foreignness" of the
transaction in Itoba, the relative insignificance of Lep's foreign
shares allocated to ADRs, and the tremendously expanded base
of liability Lep faces under Itoba, Itoba will likely cause foreign
issuers to develop an uneasiness about issuing ADRs and the
corresponding requirement to file SEC Form 20-F.
A simple hypothetical example further illustrates Itoba's
probable effect on foreign securities issuers and, in turn, the
ADR market. Before Itoba, a mature Japanese corporation in
need of capital might readily seek the benefits of the ADR
market's uncomplicated capital formation mechanism,1 6 be-
cause of its efficiency, effectiveness, and proven track re-
cord." Moreover, the availability of new ADRs to U.S. inves-
tors benefits U.S. investors by creating additional user-friendly
investment opportunities."'
However, Itoba's overreaching approach to U.S. courts'
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign securities transactions
creates serious issues for the Japanese corporation to consider
in making its capital-raising decision. As a mature corporation,
let us assume that the corporation and its directors and offi-
cers have generally operated within the existing Japanese
regulatory framework."' Additionally, let us assume that the
Japanese corporation's share price reflects its current account-
ability under that regulatory framework. 9 That regulatory
between the share price of the Lep ordinary shares and the share price of the Lep
ADRs resulting from the composition of the Lep ADRs; i.e., the Lep ADRs consist-
ed solely of Lep ordinary shares.
115. Id. at 124.
116. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
119. It is reasonable to assume that a mature corporation has generally fash-
ioned its conduct and operations within the regulatory framework which governs
its operations because the corporation has made it to that stage in its corporate
life. That is to say, it is plausible to assume that regulators would not have per-
mitted a consistently regulatory-deficient corporation to continue to operate.
120. If we accept the semi-strong form of efficiency of the Efficient Market
1996]
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framework, however, permits greater leeway for the
corporation's directors and officers to trade on inside informa-
tion than does the U.S. regulatory scheme.'21 Under Itoba, if
the Japanese corporation issues ADRs, the corporation subjects
itself, through indemnification of its directors and officers, to a
tremendously greater base of insider trading liability by rais-
ing the possibility that non-U.S. investors 122 will convince a
U.S. court to force the corporation to defend against insider
Hypothesis for the purposes of this illustration, see MIT DICTIONARY, supra note
50, at 123, the Japanese corporation's current accountability under the Japanese
regulatory framework would be publicly available information that would be im-
pounded into its share price. The Efficient Market Hypothesis denotes:
The view that the prices of shares on [a] stock market are the best
available estimates of their real value because of the highly efficient
pricing mechanism inherent in [a] stock market. There are three levels of
efficiency. First, the market is held to be 'weak-form efficient" if share
price changes are independent of past price changes. Second, semi-strong
form efficiency is present if share prices fully reflect all publicly available
information. Third, strong form efficiency will imply share prices will
have taken full account of all information whether publicly available or
not.... [Weak form efficiency is generally accepted, and semi-strong is
becoming more so.
Id.
121. Japanese securities law emanates from the 1948 Securities and Exchange
Law. Osamu Karihara, Recent Developments in the Securities and Exchange Law in
Japan, in JAPANESE BANKING, SECURITIES AND ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 77, 77
(Hiroshi Oda & R. Geoffrey Grice eds., 1988). Under this law, however, insider
trading provisions cannot be easily enforced, nor have they been. Id. at 79. Indeed:
[Allmost no legal action has been brought against insider trading since
the [Japanese] Securities and Exchange Law was enacted. This does not
mean that insider trading did not take place in the Japanese market.
Rather, it appears that current regulations are not sufficient to sustain
legal action against it.
.. . [While] extensive and detailed case law has developed in the United
States under [§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934], there has
been no similar development in Japan. This is mainly due to the fact
that under the traditional Japanese legal practice, it is not easy to im-
pose criminal sanctions in insider trading cases under [Japanese securi-
ties regulations] because [their] expression is fairly general and not spe-
cific to insider trading. For this reason, the [Japanese] Ministry of Fi-
nance has been reluctant to use [Japanese securities regulations] for
prosecuting.
Id.
122. Itoba raises the possibility that foreign nationals can use U.S. courts to
seek redress since the plaintiff in Itoba was a British company. This increases the
Japanese directors' and officers' chances of being forced to defend against charges
of violating U.S. insider trading laws in the United States, since the admixture
permits non-U.S. plaintiffs--who were previously disqualified under the effects test
when the fraud occurred abroad-to sue the corporation under such laws.
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trading charges pursuant to U.S. law in a U.S. forum.
Itoba permits non-U.S. shareholders to sue the Japanese
corporation in a U.S. court for conduct-in this case insider
trading activities-occurring in Japan and minimally affecting
U.S. investors solely based on SEC filings made to register a
relatively insignificant number of ADRs."2 ' While the
corporation's share price before issuing the ADRs does not
reflect the expanded base of liability exposed by Itoba, pursu-
ant to the efficient market hypothesis, the share price after the
ADR issuance will reflect such exposure and will likely de-
crease as a result of this exposure." Therefore, given the
directors' fiduciary duty to maximize shareholders' wealth,"
the directors will likely forego capital formation opportunities
presented by the ADR market. The Japanese corporation will
suffer since it will face a higher cost of capital due to the re-
duced supply of plausible capital. U.S. investors will also suffer
because they lose the opportunity to buy foreign securities via
an avenue proven more efficient than purchasing the securities
directly on the foreign market.'26
Given the virtues of the ADR market,27 it is important
not to dismiss lightly Itoba's potential negative effect on this
123. Jeffrey E. Glen of Berwin Leighton, counsel for defendant-appellee Lep
Group PLC, argues persuasively that this is perhaps the single greatest detrimen-
tal effect of broadening the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Telephone
Interview with Jeffrey E. Glen, counsel for defendant-appellee Lep Group PLC
(Aug. 19, 1995).
124. Under the two-test framework, the corporation's share price would not
include the expanded base of liability because neither the conduct test nor the
effects test would have been met. Therefore, before Itoba, the possibility that the
Japanese corporation would be forced into securities litigation brought by non-U.S.
plaintiffs in the United States simply did not exist, and would not have been
reflected in the corporation's share price.
125. Under the property concept of the corporation, the directors of the corpo-
ration owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation's owners (the shareholders) to maxi-
mize shareholders' wealth. Brent Nicholson, Recent Delaware Case Law Regarding
Director's Duties to Bondholders, 19 DEL. J. CORP. L. 573, 587 n.103 (1994) (citing
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264-65 (1992)). In comparison to the U.S. securities laws'
focus on accountability to shareholders, see supra note 93, Japanese securities laws
focus more narrowly on shareholders' wealth. This is evidenced by lax regulation
and enforcement of inducement payments or bribes in Japan, as compared with
relatively rigid regulation and enforcement of such payments in the United States.
See generally Langevoort, supra note 4.
126. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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market. It is especially important not to dismiss lightly this
negative effect without the benefit of the legislative fact-find-
ing process to assess the ADR market's merits while consider-
ing the interference the Itoba approach may cause.
2. Likely Negative Effect on International Comity
Aside from Itoba's potentially crippling effect on the ADR
market, Itoba's expansive approach to U.S. courts' subject
matter jurisdiction over foreign securities transactions raises
international comity concerns. International comity is "a sense
of mutual regard founded on identity of position and similarity
of institutions" between sovereign nations." This definition
embraces the notion that the United States, in fashioning its
stance on how and when to deal with foreign securities trans-
actions, should respect, as a measure of good will and courtesy,
securities regulation established in other nations.'29 This def-
inition also implicitly adheres to the ideal that Congress did
not intend to police the world's securities markets."'
However, Itoba's expansive approach to U.S. courts' sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over foreign securities transactions
does not respect the securities laws of other nations. It pre-
scribes U.S. judicial review of a British company's purchase of
British ordinary shares on the London Exchange. If U.S. courts
truly desire, as they should, to promote international comity,
128. 15 C.J.S. Commerce § 26 (1967). As one commentator put it:
[D]eterminations of jurisdiction should reflect the legitimate concerns of
other nations. Respect for other sovereigns requires that the United
States not interfere with the ability of foreign nations to prescribe rules
of conduct for its citizens. This principle of comity creates the foundation
of the international legal system. Attempts by the United States to uni-
laterally police ever greater portions of the international financial arena
destroy the good will and respect essential to the growth of an interna-
tional legal and financial community.
Matson, supra note 4, at 166.
129. See 15 C.J.S. Commerce § 26 (1967).
130. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (expli-
cating the rule that there is a strong presumption against the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law which may be overcome only in rare instances); see also
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991) (noting that federal statutes are presumed to be territorial unless there
is clear congressional intent to extend the statute extraterritorially); Matson, supra
note 4, at 162 ("The legislative intent behind the Exchange Act and the 'historical
approach' to statutory interpretation together weigh against the application of
section 10(b) to predominantly foreign transactions.").
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then a transaction like the one presented for review in Itoba
represents a golden opportunity to demonstrate such a commit-
ment.
Promoting international comity is not an empty ideal; it
benefits the United States in the long run. Insisting on inter-
national comity in U.S. courts promotes reciprocity in foreign
tribunals. As the Supreme Court noted:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly
be encouraged if... we insist on a parochial concept that all
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our
courts .... We cannot have trade and commerce in world
markets ... exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws,
and resolved in our courts.31
U.S. judicial overreaching will likely lead to similar actions by
other nations and ultimately a hardship on U.S. citizens." 2
Therefore, Itoba's increased investor protection does not
come without paying two significant prices. First, Itoba likely
stunts capital formation through the ADR market. Second, it
sacrifices international comity since a "philosophy unique to
American culture [is imposed on] foreign settings."' The
preeminent question is whether U.S. citizens want to pay these
prices for the increased investor protection-a polycentric ques-
tion most appropriately reserved for the legislature.
VI. CONCLUSION
Itoba's expansion of subject matter jurisdiction necessarily
imparts far-reaching implications.3 4 While increased investor
protection may result, substantial damage to the ADR market
and international comity may also result.3 5 It is difficult to
argue that the possible detrimental effects of the Itoba ap-
131. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
132. See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
122-23 (1812) ("It is beautiful in theory to exclaim 'fiat Justitia-ruat coelum' [let
right be done, though the heaven should fall], but justice is to be administered
with due regard to the law of nations, and to the rights of other sovereigns.").
133. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 185. Langevoort notes that U.S. securi-
ties laws focus on accountability while other nations' securities laws focus on ide-
als like profit maximization, and argues that the United States should not insist
on the focus it has chosen. See id. at 186.
134. See supra Part V.
135. See supra Part V.
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proach are not at least as compelling as the possible positive
effects.
Given the sensitive nature of the issues of whether the
availability of ADRs should be reduced, whether it is appropri-
ate to intrude on the sovereignty of other nations, and whether
it is necessary for U.S. citizens to suffer the potential retaliato-
ry effects or consequences of such an intrusion,'36 Congress
should decide such issues. "Congress should have the final say
on what competing policy interests should prevail [when it
comes to the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws] because
it is the most politically accountable branch of our govern-
ment."3 7 "It would be a terrible mistake for the judiciary to
decide when to apply U.S.... laws extraterritorially because it
lacks accountability to [the] American [public], as well as the
resources needed to evaluate which competing interests should
prevail in this area."'38 Since Congress is better able to evalu-
ate the foreign policy ramifications of applying U.S. laws
extraterritorially,3 9 it is not desirable to "remove this area of
law from the most politically accountable branch of our govern-
ment (the legislature) to the least (the judiciary)."' This is
clearly "an area where [the] American [public], not American
jurists, most need[s] to be heard."'
Without clear Congressional intent to expand the subject
matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts over foreign securities trans-
actions, Itoba represents a potentially undesirable step consid-
ering its possible detrimental effects. The legislative branch of
our three-branch system should be the branch balancing the
competing interests at stake. Given the presumption against
136. In American Banana, the Court noted that:
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to
treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place
where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an inter-
ference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
137. James Mathieu, Note, The Supreme Court's Not So Clear Statement In:
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Co., 21 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 939, 963 (1996).
138. Id. at 963.
139. Id. at 943.
140. Id. at 964.
141. Id.
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the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws12 and the impli-
cations on domestic and international financial markets and
international relations, the judiciary inappropriately shifted
U.S. policy in Itoba.
Mark B. Schwartz
142. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
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